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Introduction 
A Societal Problem 
"The only difference between a male and female doctor, 
is that after hearing the final diagnosis from a 
female physician, we always want a second opinion" 
( Ul ene, 1980) .. 
Sex bias, sex-role, sex-ster1e,otypin9, sex-discrimination 
and inferiority complex are a number of words which e·xhibit 
the many nametags we have assigned to a single problem; 
discrimination against women. Society, from ancient Greece, 
has associated women with lesse~minds, strengths, ambitions, 
capabilities and opportunities to fulfill their potentials. 
Today, scientific stud i es point to the role of cognitive 
conditioning in the shaping of gender-related personality 
differences. From birth, males and females are treated 
differently. A six month old male infant rece ives a football 
from dad, wears sneakers, and no one gives a second thought 
to throwing him in the air. On the other hand, his female 
baby sister receives a soft, pink, l ace-lined doll, wears 
lace-lined booties and bonnet, and no one dare jostle this 
fragile person lest he be prepared to withstand Dad's wrath 
(Brown, 1957) . 
It's not surprising that with this overt conditioning, 
children establish their sex-role stereotypes very early and 
perpetuate these values throughout adult life. In every culture 
and subculture, there exists a distinct pattern of expectations 
of masculine/feminine behaviors. In addition, studies have 
exhibited significant similarities of these sex-related behaviors 
extending across cultures (Campbell, 1963). 
Therefore, sex-role stereotyping and discrimination is not 
just a personal problem, plaguing only individuals, but it is 
a societal problem, restricting humanity from tapping one of its 
most valuable resources: women. 
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Chapter I 
A Societal Problem 
An Historical Problem 
Studies have shown that the earliest civilizations began 
planting the seeds of feminine inferiority and evilness (Authur, 
1973). The Greeks insisted on the low worth of women. Hesiod, 
a major figure in Greek literature, introduced the ever recurring 
theme of misogyny. His conception of the role of the female sex 
was purely pragmatic: women were to bear a man's child and 
nurse him in senility; at any other time, they were an expensive 
nuisance. The image of women inherited from the Greeks was 
summed up by Aristotle, 11 We should look on the female state 
as being, as it were, a deformity." (Hunter, 1976). 
By Roman times, women had gained unparalleled independence 
(Pomeroy, 1975). The problem with new found independence was 
that women soon became the target for the belief that female 
emancipation was responsible for the breakdown of the Roman 
family, the decline of morals and even the fall of Rome. 
The notion of female inferiority continued in the teachings 
of the Hebrews. In the creation story of the book of Genesis, 
Eve was an afterthought, created from the rib of Adam, and thus 
secondary and subordinate. 
In addition, history also reveals women's reputation not 
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only includes inferior, but also evil. The celibate formulators 
of the medieval Christian doctrine preached as follows, "Sex is 
evil; I desire sex; I cannot be evil; therefore, the object 
causing my desire, women, must be evil" (Hays, 1974). In the 
Middle Ages, one of the most horrible manifestations of this 
notion of evil was the witch craze. At first, both men and 
women were accused of sorcery, but it also quickly became a 
feminine crime (Russell, 1972). 
Modern times have abolished the myths of women as evil 
forces. But unfortunately, the same is not true of the infe-
riority myth. In America, the women's movement against this,. 
and other stereotypes, is as old as our nation. Women have 
waged an ongoing battle to gain the right to participate and 
contribute to American society as full and equal citizens. 
As early as 1776, Abigail Adams accurately perceived the crucial 
importance of the law in governing the lives of women. She 
warned her husband, John Adams, to "remember the ladies, and 
be more generous and favorable to them than your ancestors" 
(Nicholas, 1979, p. 15). Unfortunately, the founding fathers 
did not take Abigail's warning seriously. The Constitution 
that was adopted contained all the old injustices; the undue 
injustices to women. Therefore, by 1848, women's unrest 
surfaced and the first women's rights convention was organized 
to discuss the social, civil and religious rights of women 
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(Nicholas, 1979). This meeting marked the beginning of a long, 
difficult and often bitter struggle to win equal rights for 
women. 
Present Status 
Obviously, many of the repressive laws of 1848 no longer 
exist. The legal1 status of American women has risen to the 
. point that is now not far below that the American men. For 
the most part, the common law disabilities of married women 
such as contractual incapacity, loss of rights to manage~ 
receivership and control of income property owned prior to 
marriage, and complete transference to the husband of a 11 
premarital personal property, have all been recently nullified 
by statute ( Kanowi tz, 1969) 1 
Similarly, unmarried women have also made substantial 
progress in closing the gap between their own legal status 
and that of the American male. Legal obstructions, such as 
women's right to vote and serve on juries, have been judged 
unconstitutional. Federal law now endorses the principle of 
equal work, regardless of sex, and enforces penal sanctions 
for violators (Babcock, Freedman Norton & Ross, 1975) . 
Therefore, history itself exhibits the few strides women have 
made toward becoming valuable contributors to the life and 
work of American society. 
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However, present studies show that despite the progress 
toward emancipating women under the law, their social position 
is still inferior to that of men (Parlee, 1978). Perhaps 
society's continual stereotyping of women as inferior, from 
ancient Greece to modern times, has 11 inoculated 11 people 
against the counter-defenses for an egalitarian position. 
(McGuire, pp. 191-200). 
Considering the prevailing stereotypes, the latest 
figures from the United States Department of Labor are 
encouraging; 49.7 percent of all women are now in the labor 
force. In addition, of the fourteen million new jobs filled 
over the past ten years , ten million have gone to women 
(Hard Facts, 1980). The figures certainly display positive 
trends toward equalizing the labor force: positive trends. 
until other observations reveal the true picture. For 
example, promotion opportunities with the academic community 
are minimal. Only one quarter of college faculty positions 
are held by women, and most are clustered in the lower one-
third of the professional strata. Even the legal profession. 
founded on justice for all, seems reluctant to equalize females. 
Today, women constitute only 9.2% of American l.awyers (Schoenthal, 
1978). The average ratio of law-school professors is twenty 
tenured male professors to one woman professor. In addition 
obtaining a partnership in a large law firm is seemingly 
6 
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impossible. A survey showed that only twenty-one female attorneys 
are partners in all of New York City 1 s law firms (Schoenthal, 
1978). 
Oppenheimer (1970) points out that although some occupations 
have shifted dramatically from men's work to women's work; 24% 
of clerical positions in 1900 were held by women, 77% in 1974. 
He concludes that the degree of occupati ona 1 sex-typing has 
persisted almost untouched throughout the twentieth century. 
Moreover, men continue to hold more restrictive attitudes 
than women about female employment, despite the recent liberali-
zation of views (Duncan & Evers, 1975). 
But sexual biases toward women are not an exclusive 
behavior for es also exhibit biases against their 
own gender. Orchowashy and Jenkin~~l979) showed that females 
------
rated male characters faced with a moral di emma more rational 
than female characters faced with the identical dilemma. In 
addition, studies conducted by Deaux and Emswiller (1974) and 
Goldberg (1968) indicated that women, as well as men, rated 
females as generally less competent than males on complicated 
tasks. 
A female lawyer in a large private firm reported she had 
met her greatest resistance from other women. "They do their 
own sex a disservice by admitting that they don't think a woman 
attorney is as credible as a ma1e attorney" (Schoenthal, 1978 
p. 67). 
It is possible in some instances that this may actually work to a 
female attorney's advantage. With the majority of the other 
attorneys and their clients expecting their female adversaries 
to be unprepared and inarticulate, they may be rendered "off 
guard 11 against a competent female attorney's counter-arguments. 
As stated previously, the images of women's inferiority 
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still retain their value for those who wish to use them in 
defense of the existing societal status quo. Even unconsciously 
these images of women's inferiority are passed on by our parents 
through their expressed expectations for, and against, childrens' 
behaviors and future goals (Brown, 1957). Their cues set the 
groundwork for personality differences evide nt in men and women, 
which then perpetuate our traditional stereotypic beliefs about 
the persona 1 i ty and ability differences of men and women. These 
sex-role socializations restrict society in two ways: first, by 
eliminating certain new roles from bei ng considered as appropriate 
by either sex; and second , by inhibiting the introspective review 
of personal values, attitudes and beliefs by both sexes. There-
fore, the present ideology of sex-role model is perpetuated, 
internalized unconsciously as fact versus opinion thereby causing 
self evaluation to be contin ually restricted. 
Traditiona l ly, sex-role models included a belief that women 
should not achieve greater recognition than their husbands and 
that the emotional life of the family suffers when a woman works 
(Parsons, Frieze, Ruble & Croke, 1976) . Additionally, evidence 
has shown that women who believed they should achieve success 
vicariously through their husbands have significantly lower 
educational objectives. These unconscious internalizations may 
often inhibit career .-.goal attainment for females. In summation, 
women have been stereotyped as passive, submissive~ not skilled 
in business and excitable during minor crisis (Braverman, Vogel , 
Braverman, Clarkson & Rosenkrantz, 1972). 
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Chapter II 
Attitudes 
Attitudes Influence Behavior 
The concept of attitudes is indispensible, not only to 
social psychology, but also to understanding the psychology 
of peoples• personalities (Allport, 1935). Milton Rokeach 
(1968, p. 112) defined an attitude as 11 a relatively enduring 
organization of inter-related beliefs that describe, 
evaluate, and advocate action with respect to an object or 
situation, with each belief having cognitive, affective, and 
behavorial components. 11 In addition, while there may be a 
hereditary basis for attitudes (Allport, 1950), all attitudes, 
from a person's beginning, are learned. If attitudes are an 
organization of beliefs, what then are beliefs? Again, Rokeach 
(1968, p. 113) stated, 1'1A belief is any simple proposition, 
conscious or unconscious, inferred from what a person says 
or does . 11 Therefore, if persons have formed be 1 i efs about 
women and their roles, such as their passiveness, emotionality 
and obligation to proliferate the human race, they may also be 
prone to ne 1gative attitudes against the 11 libe,rated 11 women, 
conscious and/or unconscious. 
Rokeach (1968, p. 113) stated that beliefs have three 
components: cognitive, representing a person's knowledge, 
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affective, emotional predispositions of varying intensity, either 
positive or negative with respect to the attitude object; and 
lastly, a behavorial component, leading to actions when activated. 
The relationship between each component is so close that 
they will work simutaneously. For example, a juror feels Ms. 
Smith's (a female defense attorney) closing argument was an 
emotional appeal, but somewhat valid. Believing that females 
are innately overly emotional (cognitive component), the juror 
begins to question the objectivity of Ms. Smith and her argument 
(affective component). Consequently, the juror may discredit the 
validity of Ms. Smith's case and render a guilty verdict (behavorial 
component) dramatic example, but one that must be considered. 
' Katz (1960) exhibits that . due to the nature of attitudes, 
preferential responses includes two dimensions: affection and 
evaluation. In other words, it is possible to LIKE something 
that is bad, cigarettes or sugar, or to DISLIKE something that 
is good, vegetables and speed regulations. A person's pre-
ferential responses, whether positive or negative, depend on 
the strength of their evaluative attitudes, and, the strength 
of those positive or negative feelings toward the object or 
situation. 
The strength of one's convictions gains a great deal of 
meaning when applied to the theory of attitudes. Social 
scientists agree that a person's attitude system is a 
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comprehensive collection of their beliefs; beliefs that will f orm 
organized attitudes about people, objects and events. In 
addition, these attitudes are stratified, beginning from one ' s 
most central values to the more peripheral beliefs . The centra l 
values are basic and fundamental to everything a person perceives 
about his world's physical and social reality. These central 
values are more difficult to change. However, when they are 
altered, subsequent changes occur to any connected beliefs 
(Rokeac h, 1960, pp. 32-33) . The peripheral, or outer belie f s , 
ar e connected to the central values and belief s . They cannot 
effi c i ently alter or change these central be l iefs, but will 
themselves be alte,red i f a central be li ef i s s hakenA These 
central beliefs concerni ng attitudes about social reality, 
sel f-concept and t he ideal se l f and its va l ues are critical 
in determi ni ng behavior (Steinfatt, 1977, pp . 177 -178). But 
consider one's peri pheral bel ief s , whi ch i nclude credibi ity 
and atti t udes towar d other pe r sons . hat i mportance do t ey 
pl ay i n af fec t ing behavi or? 
Rokeac h (1 963, pp. 172- 174) postulated tat ese 
pre fer e nt ial' r es ponses t oward an a ttitude object do o occ 
in a vac uum , but in the context of a social s·t a o a o 
which we al so have attitudes. hu~ soc·a1 e ha · s e 
combined r esponse elicited by attit des to ard 
and a s ·tuation. s Krech, Cr c field ad a 
stated, 11 ction is determined, not by a s e a 
0 
ac e 
a o ·ec 
( 2 
e 
by a number of attitudes, wants and situational conditions ''. 
The recognition that the two kinds of attitudes i nteract 
with each other implies that they may have differing degrees 
of importance or influence over responses. According to 
Campbell (1963, p. 1:56), 111 we have that different situational 
thresholds that explain some apparent inconsistencies between 
attitudes and behaviors, or between one behavior and another 
across situations 11 • Because of these varying social pressures 
inherent across situations, discriminatory behavior toward a 
specific attitude object may occur in one setting but not 
another. For example, negative attitudes about working women 
and their capabilities might be actjvated in situations where 
professional women hold professional positions. That is, 
women (object) who work may encounter more discriminat i on 
and bias as professionals (situation) than clerical positions 
(situation). The subordinate nature of most clerica l positions 
fits into societies' traditional set of attitudes concerning 
womens' roles (Parlee, 1978). 
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Source Credibility: Its Effects on Attitude Change 
The study of whom we believe, and the way in which we 
believe them, is called 11 source credibility 11 (Steinfatt, 1977, 
p. 164). Credibility is in the eyes of the beholder and has 
several dimensions. Berlo, Lemert and Mertz (1969} used a 
semantic differential scale to study the dimensions of 
credibility . They proposed several dimensions; however, this 
discussion will focus on only three: trustworthiness, 
competence and dynamism. This research will focus on how 
these dimensions affect attitudes toward a message source. 
Berlo et al. contended that a person's perception of 
honesty was tied to one's own beliefs about how that other 
person reacted to them. Our perception of others' honesty , 
friendliness, pati ·ence, warmth and safety are crucial to our 
attitudinal constructs about those others. Source credibility 
is an attitude held by one individual toward another . 11 That 
attitude is formed through our experiences with the other 
person 11 (Ste i nfa tt, 1977, p. 173) . If the expe·ri ences ,, whether 
overt or covert, have been negative, so will the credibility 
rating of that person. 
Consider the previous example of Ms. Smith the female 
defense attorney. She has now been retained as cou nsel for 
John Doe, who is charged with the murder of a twelve year old 
girl. The evidence is strictly circumstantial, but it is 
also incriminating. Initia lly, jurors may form favorable or 
14 
unfavorable first impression attitudes about the case based 
on their personal subconscious belief systems. Ms. Smith 
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then approaches the jury box and begins her opening statements 
using both opinionated language and strong emotional appeals. 
Infante (1975) defined "opinionated language 11 as the derrogation 
of any source who disagreed with one's initial argument (p. 115 ). 
Infante reported that the use of opinionated language functione d 
as a strong determinant of the audiences' ratings of t he 
communicator's credibility (pp. 117-119). In addit i on, by 
using strong, emotional appeals, Ms ~ Smith may negate the 
jurors favorable first impressions based on preconceived beli efs 
associated with women: friendly, patient, warm and ho ne s t. 
In other words, the jurors may no longer consider Ms. Smith a 
trustworthy person; a key dimension of source credibility. 
Steinfatt (1977, p. 174) discussed the second i mpor ta nt 
dimension of source credibility: 11 competence 11 • Stei nfa tt 
defined competence as the "qualifications or authori ta ti veness 
of a person; the degree of his expertness. " 
Again, reviewing previous studies on female s (Par l ee, 1978 ; 
Braverman, Vogel, Brovermen, Clarkson & Rose nkr antz , 1972) 
researchers reported that traditionally male and female attitudes 
toward female competence in positions other t han wi fe and mothering 
roles are consistently low . Tannenbaum (1 954 ) re ported 
attitudes that the audience members brough t wi th them into a 
communication situation determined their perceptions, either 
favorable or unfavorablle,. of the credibility of source and 
his message. It follows, then, if jurors had preconceived 
attitudes of female incompetence, Ms. Smith may inherit 
those biased attitudes. Again, jurors may consciously or 
unconsciously rate Ms. Smith low on the competence dimension. 
The third dimension found by Berlo and his associates 
is dynamism (Berlo, Lemert & Mertz, 1969). According to these 
authors, 1'1dynami sm is the perception of a source 1 s energy 
and activity. A dynamic person is perceived as aggressive, 
emphathetic and bold, as opposed to meek, hesitant and timid 111 
(p. 570). Braverman et al. (1972) reported societal stereo-
types of females including passive, submissive and indecisive 
about business matters. Hunter (1976) described women as 
having lower educational and business aspirations than men. 
Parsons, Frieze, Ruble and Croke (1976) contended that due to 
the traditional belief that women should not achieve greater 
recognition than their husbands, that when females decided to 
pursue a career, these nonconscious internalizations inhibited 
their success. Research supported the contention that, 
initially, Ms. Smith may not be considered a dynamic individual, 
QQJ.xbecause of. the traditional female stereotype described by 
Braverman et al. (1972). 
Steinfatt (1977, p. 175) added that if an individual is 
16 
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seen as untrustworthy or incompetent, the perception of "high 
dynamism" may make that individual appear even more incompetent 
and untrustworthy. As stated before, Ms. Smith may have received 
a low rating on this dimension because of her "opinionated 
language" (Infante, 1975, p. 115). These combined low ratings on 
all three· dimensions may render Ms. Smith a noncredible attorney. 
Numerous studies have isolated the source credibility 
variable and its importance to attitude change . Zagna and 
Harter (1966) stated, "As credibility of the source increased, 
the percentage of subjects who agreed with that source's infor-
mation and perceived it as trustworthy also increased" (p. 138). 
In their classic study, Hovland and Weiss (1951) reported, 
"Opinion change in the direction advocated by the persuader 
was much greater when the persuader was attributed with high 
credibility, than when he/she was rated as a low credible 
source" (p. 651). Therefore, if Ms. Smith was perceived by 
the jurors as low in competence, trustworthiness and dynamism, 
she was also perceived as a low credible source and her messages 
were rendered impotent as persuasive mechanisms used to facilitate 
opinion changes from the jurors. 
In summary, society has nurtured stereotypic attitudes about 
womens' roles, capabilities and appropriate aspirations. Ms. 
Smith, unfortunately, may become the object of the jurors' 
preconceived attitudes . Then the courtroom situation itself, 
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compounded by the behavior Ms. Smith must employ in that situation, 
may add to the jurors 1 misconception and bias regarding her 
credibility. The negative attitude toward Ms. Smith may activate 
behavior in the form of a guilty verdict for her client. The 
guilty verdict would not be based solely on the evidence involved 
in the case, but based on the personal cognitions jurors have 
assimilated about the credibility of the source defending John 
Doe. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to explore the problem of sex-
role discrimination in a courtroom context. Specifically, it is 
important to examine the effects of potential sexual bias on 
the credibility and effectiveness of a female attorney. If these 
effects are significant, female attorneys and their clients may 
be inheriting a legacy of inferiority, or more crucially, guilt, 
without substantial reason. Our jurors may be disposing 
judgments based on biases, not evidence. 
Hypotheses: 
The following predictions are based upon the assumption 
that the sexual biases discussed in the introduction will be 
manifested in a simulated trial context. 
Hypothesis I: 
Subjects will rate the female attorney less credible 
than the male attorney . 
Hypothesis II: 
Subjects will render more "guil ty 11 verdicts to the fema le 
attorney's client than to the male attorney's c l ient. 
Hypothesis II I: 
Subjects will "retain" the male attorney more frequently 
than they will 11 retain 111 the, female attorney as their 
personal counsel. 
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Pilot Test 
Chapter III 
Methodology 
Four females and four males were tested to identify two 
voices, one male and one female, that displayed similar delivery 
styles. Thirty subjects listened to the eight audio tapes 
of the male/female defense attorneys' closing arguments. 
Each voice was then rated on two semantic differential scales. 
vocal similarity and credibility (see Appendix A for complete 
derivation). The vocal similarity scale included four factors: 
rate of speech, nonfluencies, vocal pitch and accent. The 
credibility scale included three factors: trustworthiness, 
competence and dynamism. Lastly, a rating of 11 overall 11 vocal 
pleasantness was determined. A series of t-tests were conducted 
to compare each male with each female voice. The voices selected 
for use in the experiment did not differ significantly on any of 
the eight factors. 
Cover Story 
Subjects were told that the study concerned the measurement 
of comprehension and memory of audio-taped portions of actual 
trials. The alleged purpose was to evaluate the possibility of 
actually trying cases through the mode of audio tapes. 
20 
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Subjects 
The subjects were 169 University of Central Florida students, 
84 female subjects and 85 male subjects, all subjects were enrolled 
in required speech classes. The decision to use a student sample 
versus a juror sample was based on data provided by Pryor, Taylor, 
Buchanan and Strawn (1980). These researchers compared data 
collected from actual jurors and university students on a variety 
of dependent measures involving comprehension and attitudes 
toward jury instructions. There were not significant differences 
between the jury and student scores . Therefore, the external 
validity of this study should not be threatened by the use of 
students as opposed to jurors. 
Design 
An after-only, control group design was used to collect the 
data. The independent variables were the subjects' attitudes 
and judgments regarding the attorney's credibility and the 
~ client's guilt or innocence . Five experime nta l groups, consisting 
of 30 to 33 subjects per group were utilized. All groups 
evalu,ated a "breaking and entering 11' case summary (see Appendix B 
for complete derivation). Four of the groups listened to the 
audio-taped version of the defense attorney's closing arguments 
(see Appendix C for complete derivation) as they read the arguments. 
Two of the four groups listened to the fema le attorney's voice 
and two groups listened to t he male attorney's voice. The fifth 
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group, used as the eontrol group, simply read the closing argument. 
The dependent variable, attorney credibility, was operationally 
defined by the use of two measurements. The first measurement 
was McCroskey's (1966) semantic differential scales measuring 
two dimensions of credibility: trustworthiness and competence 
(see Appendix D for complete derivation). 
The second measurement was facilitated by the question, 
"Would you retain this attorney as your personal counsel?" 
Yes No Why? (see Appendix E for complete 
derivation). 
The verdict variable was operationalized by the question, 
11 00 you find the defendent guilty or innocent?" Guilty __ _ 
Innocent Why? (see Appendix E for complete derivation). 
Procedure 
Each speech class was asked to participate in a study assessing 
courtroom communications. The same female experimenter admin-
istered all treatments. Subjects were not debriefed until all the 
data had been collected, thus precluding biasing due to inter-
subject communications. 
the following sequence: 
The procedures were administered in 
(l) Subjects read a two-page summary 
of the mock "breaking and entering" case. This case was previously 
tested and produced a 50/50 guilty/not guilty verdict ratio for 
both sexes (Pryor et al., 1980). (2) The experimenter asked 
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subjects to read the defense attorney's closing arguments. This 
is where the gender variable was manipulated. Four of the five 
experimental groups listened to the audio-taped version of the 
male or female attorneys deliver their closing arguments. The 
remaining group, used as the control, only read the closing 
argument. (3) The subjects completed the questionnaires 
involving attorney evaluation and verdict. (4) Subjects were 
instructed not to discuss the experiment with anyone, then 
dismissed. 
Mani p u l at i on _Check 
Chapter IV 
Results and Discussion 
A test to determine the validity of the male and female 
attorney gender manipulation was facilitated by the use of a 
yes/no question requesting subjects to identify the sex of the 
attorney (see Appendix E for complete derivation). In both 
gender manipulations, all subjects correctly identified the 
attorney's sex. The control group was not exposed to any 
attorney-sex suggestions. However, as previous research 
implied (Schoenthal, 1978), there was a strong tendency for 
subjects to assume the attorney was male. Forty-two of the 
forty-five male and female control group subjects identified 
the attorney as a male. The remaining three, all females, 
stated correctly that neither gender had been specified. 
Credibility Scales 
McCroskey's (1966) semantic differential scale for 
measuring the trustworthiness and competence dimensions of 
credibility were used to rate the attorney's credibility. 
Each scale was comprised of six bi-polar adjectives along a 
seven point continuum. Mccroskey used the summed scores of 
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all six components to establish if there were differences between 
subjects and/or groups. 
In order to use these two dimensions to measure credibility, 
it would be necessary to re-establish significant correlations 
among the factors of the two dimensions. McCroskey's trust-
worthiness dimension factors include intelligence, friendly, 
pleasant, honest, virtuous and reliable. Whether these factors 
would correlate positively among each other in this current 
context was an empirical question. Intuitively, one might 
argue that subjects may rate an attorney as intelligent, but 
not necessarily honest or pleasant. The same question may be 
raised regarding the competence dimension which includes 
capable, prepared, competent, expert, experienced and trained. 
Subjects may, for example, rate an attorney capable, but not 
well-prepared. Therefore, to optimize the internal validity, 
each component of the trustworthiness and competence dimensions 
were analyzed separately for hypothesis testing. 
Test of Hypothesis 
Results of Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 are presented here in order 
to facilitate explanation of findings for the two predictions 
involving credibility. The hypotheses regarding credibility 
were examined with a series of t-tests. 
The first prediction assumed the female attorney would 
receive lower credibil'ity ratings than the male attorney. 
Factors 
Table 1 
Mean Trustworthiness Ratings for Male 
and Female Attorneys by Female Subjects 
Female Attorney Male Attorney 
Intelligence 4.8 5.8 10 
Friendly 4.4 5.2 Co 
Pleasant 4.7 5.6 
Honest 4 .. 5' 4.9 1 
Virtuous 4.7 5.0 
Reliable 4.3 5.0 7 
(n = 32) (n = 30) 
Note. n=32 and n=30 respectively, indicate the number 
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Probabilities 
.003 
. 012 
.007 
.221 
.394 
. 133 
of subjects in both groups who rated the attorneys. 
Factors 
Table 2 
Mean Trustworthiness Ratings for Male 
and Female Attorneys by Male Subjects. 
Female Attorney Male Attorney 
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Probabilities 
Intelligence 5.8 I 5.6 ,; . 401 , 
Friendly 4.7 5. l .333 
Pleasant 5. 1 5. 2 ''J .642 
Honest 4.8 .j 4.6 . 601 
Virtuous 4.6 5. 1 .113 
Re 1iab1 e 5. l 5.3 .543 
(n = 31 ) (n = 30} 
Note. n=31 and n=30 respectively, indicate the number 
of subjects in both groups who rated the attorneys. 
28 
Table 3 
Mean Competence Ratings for Male and 
Female Attorney by Female Subjects 
Factors Female Attorney Male Attorney Probabilities 
Capable 4.9 5.6 .003 
Prepared 5.6 6.0 .252 
Competence 5.2 5.4 .592 
Expert 4.5 5.3 .021 
Experience 4.8 5.7 .013 
Trained 5.0 5.7 .035 
(n = 32) (n = 30~ 
Note. n=32 and n=30 respectively, indicate the number 
of subjects in both groups who rated the attorneys. 
Table 4 
Mean Competence Ratings for Male and 
Female Attorneys by Male Subjects 
Factors Female Attorney Male Attorney Probabilities 
Capable 5.7 5.9 
Prepared 6.2 6.7 
Competence 6.0 6.0 
Expert 4.9 5.3 
Experienced 5.5 5.8 
Trained 5.6 5.7 
(n = 31) (n = 30) 
Note. n=31 and n=30 respectively, indicate the number of 
subjects in both groups who rated the attorneys. 
. 591 
.673 
.745 
.341 
.494 
.441 
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Tables l and 3 showed that female subjects rated the female 
attorney significantly lower on seven of the twelve components. 
These included intelligence, friendly, pleasant, capable, 
expert, experienced and trained. Conversely, male subjects 
yielded no significant differences in ratings of the two 
attorneys. However, in terms of direction, the males rated 
the male attorney higher on nine of the twelve components, 
equal on one component, competence, and inferior on only 
two components, intelligence and honesty. 
The data clearly demonstrated that the female attorney 
was rated as generally less credible than the male attorney. 
It is noteworthy, that of the twenty-four component evaluations 
shown in tables 1 through 4, females received only two higher 
scores; honesty and intelligence, and neither was statistically 
significant. In summary, the data supported Hypothesis I. 
Hypotheses II and III were tested by the use of chi-square 
analysis. Hypothesis II predicted that subjects would render 
more 11 guilty 11 verdicts to the female attorney's client than to 
the male attorney's client. 
The results demonstrated that the female attorney's 
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client did receive more guilty verdicts than the male attorney's 
client (n= 33 and 22 resp., chi square= 1.5, 1 df, p. < .25). 
Therefore, Hypothesis II received directional support. 
Hypothesis III predicted that subjects would more frequently 
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11 retain 11 the male attorney than the female attorney as personal 
counsel. The results indicated that the male attorney was 
11 retained 11 significantly more often than the female attorney 
(n = 39 and 25, respectively; chi-square= 7.29, 1 df, p. < .01). 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine attorney 
credibility and trial outcomes as a function of attorney 
gender. Previously cited research implies that, traditionally, 
women have been rated inferior to men (Parlee, 1978). Women 
were rated less competent than men by both males and females 
(Deaux &-Emswiller, 1974; Goldberg, 1968). Parsons, Frieze, 
Ruble and Croke ( 1976) demonstrated that society persists in 
embracing the belief that the family suffers when "mother" 
leaves home for the working world. Additionally, Schoenthal 
(1978) has contended that the credibility gap between men and 
women widens as women move into the professional strata. 
Communication research shows that beliefs and attitudes 
are anchored to our central values (Rockeach, 1960, pp. 32-33), 
and that those beliefs and attitudes about social reality are 
critical in determining behaviors. Thus if women's inferiority 
has been the prevailing social reality, one's behaviors may be 
predicated on that central belief, not the reality of a situation. 
Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey (1962) stated, 11 Action is 
determined, not by a single attitude, but by a number of attitudes, 
wants and situational conditions" (p. 163). This premise, 
coupled with Schoenthal's premise that the credibility gap 
widens as women move into professional occupations, strongly 
implies that society's perception of females being less 
credible than males, combined with society's perception 
that a "woman's place is in the home," could distort 
society 1 s perception about the credibility of a female 
attorney. Therefore, juror assessments of Ms. Smith as 
being less credible than her male counterpart (attitude) 
coupled with her occupational misplacement in the legal 
profession (situation) may ultimately lead to a guilty 
verdict (behavior) for her innocent client (Rokeach, 1968, 
p. 114). 
Hypothesis I, which predicted that subjects would rate 
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the female attorney less credible than the male attorney, was 
supported. While the support was only directional for male 
subjects, female subjects rated the female attorney significantly 
lower on 7 of the 12 components. Therefore, this study reinforces 
the findings of Parlee (1978); Deaux and Emswiller (1974); 
Schoenthal (1978); Braverman, Vogel, Braverman, Clarkson and 
Rosenkrantz (1972) contending that society continually per-
petuates the beliefs about female inferiority, especially in 
the professional occupations. 
But why did the female subjects judge the female attorney 
so harshly? Two statements may serve as plausible explanations 
for the females' reactions. First, females, more often than 
males, are the perpetuators of family tradition (Parlee, 1978). 
These feminine central values of "motherhood and apple pie" 
may have waged a subconscious war against those individuals 
who dared to destroy the status quo. Ms. Smith, the liberated 
female professional, may be considered a turncoat, and thus 
an enemy, not an ally. Therefore~ she becomes less credible, 
first, because she is a woman (attitude) and, secondly, because 
she is an attorney (situation). 
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Second, Ms. Smith is living proof that any female may 
achieve success in the outside world and she exemplifies 
society 1 s definition of the 11 ideal" woman. However, Ms. Smith's 
success may mirror the reality of other females' 11 nonsuccess. 11 
Congruity Theory (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955, p. 43) predicts 
that perceived inconsistencies between subjects' cognitions of 
their "ideal" and "real" self will produce an internal imbalance. 
When activated, this imbalance will cause subjects considerable 
discomfort, resulting in attempts to adjust this imbalance. 
In reviewing the curcumstances of the present study, Ms. Smith, 
the professional, liberated women, may have been just the catalyst 
needed to activate female subjects' internal imbalances. To 
minimize these imbalances, female subjects may have unconsciously 
derogated the source; Ms. Smith. This may explain why female 
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subjects rated the female attorney less credible than the male 
attorney on all twelve credibility factors. The above premises 
may also suggest plausible explanations for the subliminal 
weaknesses consistently restricting the "~Jomen 's Movement" 
itself. Perhaps the "Movement" signals a greater threat for 
women's central values than men's; thus females are constantly 
creating counterarguments against the "Movement's" persuasive 
propaganda. 
Hypothesis II, which predicted that subjects would render 
more 11 guilty 11 verdicts for the female attorney's client than 
the male attorney's · clie~t, received weak support. The exoerimenter's 
use of a mock police report provided "evidence" that subjects 
could use in reaching a verdict. Ninety-two percent of the male 
and female subjects specified that evidence was the determining 
factor in their judgments of guilt or innocence. Only eight 
percent attributed 11 attorney ere di bil i ty" as the determinant. 
On one hand, it is quite possible that more subjects used 
attorney credibility as a determinant but did so unconsciously. 
Yet it appears that the overwhelming number of respondents did 
use evidence as the primary basis for their decisions. This 
may have masked the credibility biases. 
Hypothesis III, which predicted that the subjects would 
"retain" the male attorney as personal counsel more often than 
the female attorney, was supported. These results were consistent 
with the findings of recent research. Oppenheimer (1970) 
exhibited that the persistent, subconscious sex-typing of 
females in nonprofessional positions has remained untouched in 
the twentieth century. Duncan and Evers (1975) showed that the 
restrictive attitudes toward females in business are alive and 
well today. Deaux and Emswiller (1974) indicated that both 
men and women rated females less competent than males. And 
current statistics on occupational trends (Schoenthal, 1978) 
have shown that the reluctance of society to relinquish 
traditional attitudes about women's roles persist · in today's 
liberated world. The significant support for Hypothesis III, 
coupled with the control groups almost unanimous assumption 
that the attorney was male, are important indicators of the 
value of this and further research concerning occupational 
sex-biasing. 
Limitations of the Study 
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A limitation of the study concerned the gender manipulation. 
Through the use of a pilot study, the experimenter attempted to 
control for any extraneous variables. By equalizing the male 
and female delivery characteristics, internal validity was 
strengthened. However, generalizability is limited since only 
one male and one female voice was used to vary attorney gender. 
It would be valuable to replicate the experiment and use 
several different male and female voices. 
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An additional limitation of the study was the stimulus used 
to effect perceptions of attorney gender. Perhaps the use of a 
combined video-audio tape of the attorneys, rather than just 
the audio version of the closing arguments, would have produced 
a more life-like situation, and thus, subject's ratings of high 
or low attorney credibility may also have been magnified. However, 
by adding "reality" to the gender manipulation, the experimenter 
may have threatened the study's internal validity. Replications 
involving such alternate means of gender manipulations and 
stimuli would be worthwhile. 
The results of the experiment suggest two major implications. 
First, there may exist a subconscious bias, by both males and 
females, against female's credibility in the professional 
occupations. Secondly, the central values of females, as only 
mothers and wives, may have been anchored too solidly for even 
the "Women's Movernent 11 to dislodge. To change females' 
traditional values would also require females to restructure 
their belief and attitude systems. Perhaps the threat of 
destruction to the female's status quo has caused women to 
defensively avoid messages and persons supporting the liberation 
movement. To protect themselves, and their families, females 
may have subconsciously invented excuses for discrediting sources 
and their arguments defending destruction of the traditional 
female model. 
Summary 
The purpose of this experiment was to observe the effects 
of attorney gender on subjects' evaluations of attorney 
credibility and trial outcomes. The independent variable 
was operationalized by the use of audio-taped versions of a 
male and female attorneys 1 closing arguments. The variables 
were manipulated over three conditions: (1) Subjects read 
and listened to the female attorney's argument; (2) subjects 
read and listened to the male attorney's argument; and (3) 
the control subjects read the arguments only. 
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Attorney credibility was measured by the use of McCroskey's 
(1966) credibility dimension scales. Subjects also responded 
to questions involving their "verdict" judgments of the case 
and whether they would 11 retain 11 the attorney as their personal 
counsel. 
The key results demonstrated that subjects rated the 
female attorney less credible than the male attorney . The 
female subjects rendered signiciantly lower credibility 
ratings for the female attorney than the male attorney, while 
the male subjects rated the female attorney only slightly 
less credible than the male attorney. This evidence demonstrated 
that both female and male subjects exhibited credibility biases 
against the female attorney. In addition, the data exhibited 
that female subjects rated their own sex more harsh1y than did 
the male subjects. 
The second hypothesis, suggesting that more 11 guilty 11 
verdicts would be rendered to the female attorney's client, 
received only directional support. However, even with the 
minimal differences between the number of male/female 
attorney's 11 guilt 11 verdicts, it was evident that the female 
subjects continued to discredit the female attorney , and her 
client, more than did the male subjects. 
In line with the third hypothesis, the male attorney 
was 11 retained 11 significantly more often than the female 
attorney. Again, female subjects displayed a significantly 
greater relectance to "retain" a female attorney as counsel 
than did the male subjects. 
Finally, and what may be the most telling results of 
the study, is the control subject's overwhelming assumption 
that the attorney was male. This finding suggests that even 
today females may be considered 11 out-of-place 11 in the 
professional occupations. 
The initial. question of this present study, concerning 
the possibility of sexual discrimination affecting jurors 
attitudes towards female attorneys and their clients, has 
been answered. Sexual biases exist and could well be 
contaminating our courtrooms. Therefore, the problem of 
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sexual discrimination must be cons i dered beyond its socia l 
and economical ramifications; it must be considered as a 
probabl~ legal issue as well' .. 
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~ppen·dix A 
Vocal Similarity Rating 
RATE OF SPEECH 
SLOW FAST 
NON FLUENCIES 
MANY NONE 
VOCAL PITCH 
LO\AJ HIGH 
ACCENT 
NOfff NOTICEABLE 
IF NOTI CEP.BLE, DEFINE FROM WHICH U.S. REGION 
CREDIBILITY RATING: rate on a scale from 1 to 5 (low to high) 
TRUSTWORTHY 
LOW 
COMPETENCE 
Lm~ 
DYNAMISM 
LOW 
OVERALL VOCAL PLEASANTNESS 
LO\-J 
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HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
HIGH 
Case Summary 
Victim: 
Location: 
Date: 
Ti me: 
Appendix B 
Acme Drugs 
Orange Avenue Shopping Center 
June 25, 1980 
2:00 a.m. 
Predawn (2:00 a.m.) 
1. Silent alarm at police headquarters notifies authorities of 
robbery in progress. 
2. Contact officer proceeds to scene. 
3. Upon arrival, officer hears commotion in rear; proceeds to 
rear of store with weapon drawn. 
4. As the officer rounds the corner of the building, he sees a 
black male, approximately medium build, running from the scene. 
5. Officer follows but is unable to apprehend the man before he 
enters a wooded area; while pursuing the suspect, the offi cer 
notices that the man in question has a peculiar stride, as if 
dragging one leg; not knowing if the suspect is armed, the 
officer does not follow but rather returns to patrol car to 
have the area sealed off. 
6. Officer then returns to the crime scene, where he is joined by 
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two back-up units. 
7. Investigation reveals that the thief entered the drugsto re t hrou gh 
rear window by sawing steel bars and breaking glass. 
8. A hacksaw with the initials 11 !. D . 11 scratched into the plastic 
handle is found near point of illegal entry. 
9. Further investigation finds pharmaceutical area of store in 
disarray and approximately $200 worth of ba rbi tua tes were 
found missing from display case which had been broken into . 
10. Also found near the broken case was a recently extinguished 
roll-your-own cigarette butt; another was found near the win-
dow. 
11. Prints on the hacksaw were smudged so no usable prints could 
be lifted .. 
12. When reconstructing the crime, detectives figured the thief 
tripped the alarm as he was leaving the scene, thus unknow-
ingly giving himsel.f enough time to flee the scene before 
police officers arrived. 
13. Later the same morning (3:00 a.m.), uniformed pol, ice noticed 
a black male matching suspect's description l imping hurriedl y 
along road in a predominantly white residential section appro-
ximately 10 blocks from crime scene . 
14. The uniformed officers stopped and questioned the man, who 
was then identified as Isiah Dawkins, a recent parolee. 
15. After further investigation~ Isiah Dawkins was arrested one 
42 
week later and charg,ed by information with the breaking and 
entering of Acme Drugstore with the intent to commit a felony. 
43 
Appendix C 
Defense Attorney's Closing Argument 
Ladies and gentlerren of the jury, what we have here is plain-
ly an unfortunate case of mistaken identity. Isiah Dawkins just 
happened to be at the wrong places at all the right times. But 
please, ladies and gentlemen, consider the evidence the prosecu-
tor has offered thus far. It's all only circumstantial. He con-
tends his only eye witness, the police officer, saw a black male 
leaving the scene of the crime with a distinctive stride as though 
he had a bad leg. But will the officer, the only eye witness, 
make a positive I.D.? You heard his reservation, then refusal to 
positively identify Isiah as the man he saw leaving the crime. 
What was it the officer said, "It was just too dark to be sure." 
Ladies and gentlemen, do you realize how many black men in this 
area resemble Isiah in stature? Quite a few. In addition, to 
address the problem of the unusual stride, you have all seen 
Isiah as he approached the bench. Did you notice anything unusua l 
about his walk? 
The prosecution has made emphasis of Isiah's previous record. 
Ladies and gentlemen, selling a few "joints" does not a criminal 
make. Certainly not in the same league as breaking, enteri ng and 
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robbery. 
Let us review several other coincidences the prosecutor sug-
gests are fact. First, about Isiah's hacksaw being found at the 
scene of the crime. Surely all of you know the problem of petty 
theft these days. It's roore than likely the saw was stolen, then 
used to open the drug case by the same person who stole it. Se-
condly, the pharmacist may have seen Isiah in the drug store that 
afternoon. Again, ladies and gentlemen, it's not against the law 
to browse in a drug store. It is also not unlikely that Isiah may 
have touched several of the store's contents, thus explaining his 
fingerprints being identified. 
The remaining evidence offered by the prosecution is, again, 
only circumstantial and not worth wasting your time and patience 
rehashing. Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, in closing, let me 
remind you of the only evidence offered, during the trial, that is 
not circumstantial. First, there was never a positive I.D. of 
Isiah as the robber. Secondly, the police did not find the drugs 
that were stolen in Isiah's possession. Thirdly, Isiah has pleaded , 
under oath, to be not guilty. 
Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, you don't have positi ve iden-
tification, you don't have possession and most i mportantly, yo u 
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don't have an admission of guilt. All you really have is an unfor-
tunate combination of circumstances. Circumstances~ that do not 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that that man, Isiah Dawkins, is 
guilty. 
Thank you, I rest my case. 
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Appendix D 
Evaluation of Attorney 
Please evaluate the attorney by placing an x at the point on each 
scale which best represents your opinions. 
In my opinion the attorney is: 
Intelligent 
---
Friendly 
Pleasant 
Honest 
Virtuous 
Reliable 
In my opinion the attorney is: 
Capable 
Prepared 
Competent 
Expert 
Experienced 
Trained 
Unintell igent 
Unfriendl y 
Unpleasan t 
Dishonest 
Sinful 
Unreliable 
Incapable 
Nonprepared 
Incompetent 
Ignorant 
Inexperienced 
Untrained 
Would you retain this attorney as your personal council? 
Yes No 
---
Briefly explain the reason(s) for your decision. 
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Appendix E 
This is an anonymous questionnaire. Do not write your 
name on this form. We need the following information to aid 
us in our analysis. Please check (x) the appropriate responses 
to the following questions. 
1. SEX: MALE FEMALE 
---
2. AGE: 18-40 41-64 65 and over 
---
3. OCCUPATIONAL STATUS: EMPLOYED UNEMPLOYED 
---
RETIRED 
4. Describe your occupation (if retired, indicate former 
occupation) 
5. EDUCATION: (Circle highest grade of school completed) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 B 9 10 11 12 College: 1 2 3 4 more 
6. PRIOR JURY DUTY: YES NO 
Please record your verdict on the lines below. 
I find the defendant, Isiah Dawkins, 
guilty 
---
not guilty 
---
of breaking and entering with intent to comnit a felony. 
Briefly explain the reason(s) for your decision. 
Pl ease record your reco 11 ecti on of the attorney 1 s name and 
sex. NAME 
SEX: 
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